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fair debt P ractices act
Does the “Bona Fide” Error Defense of the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act Include Mistakes of Law?
CASE AT A GLANCE
The Fair Debt Collections Practices Act requires a debt collector to send a validation notice to a debtor that
provides an opportunity for the debtor to challenge the validity of the debt. In this case the debt collector
served the debtor with a validation notice and required the debtor to challenge the validity of the debt in
writing, albeit the FDCPA is silent on the means of challenge. Upon a finding of a violation of the FDCPA, the
debt collector raised the FDCPA’s bona fide error defense to the mistake of law.

Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich LPA et al.
Docket No. 08-1200
Argument Date: January 13, 2010
From: The Sixth Circuit
by Ralph C. Anzivino
Marquette University Law School

ISSUE
Do a debt collector’s legal errors qualify for the “bona fide” error
defense under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA)?

FACTS
Respondents are an Ohio law firm concentrating in real estate and
foreclosure law and an associate attorney at the firm. They were
retained by Countrywide Home Loans, which held the mortgage
on petitioner Karen L. Jerman’s home. In April 2006, they filed a
complaint in state court to foreclose on the house. Three days later,
respondents served Jerman with both the complaint and, as required
by the FDCPA, a validation notice informing her of her legal rights.
Under the act, the validation notice must include a statement that
unless the consumer, within thirty days after receipt of the notice,
disputes the validity of the debt, or any portion thereof, the debt will
be assumed to be valid by the debt collector. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)
(3). By its terms, the provision does not require that the dispute be
made in writing. Nevertheless, respondents’ notice informed Jerman
that her debt would be presumed valid unless disputed “in writing.”
After receiving the notice, she hired an attorney, who wrote a letter
disputing the debt. In response, Countrywide checked its records and
discovered that Jerman had fully repaid her mortgage. Respondents
then dismissed their state-court complaint.
Jerman subsequently filed a suit in federal court, alleging a violation
of § 1692g(a)(3) of the FDCPA. Her amended complaint sought actual
and statutory damages, injunctive and declaratory relief, and class
certification. Respondents moved to dismiss on the basis that their
notice complied with the act. The district court denied the motion,
finding that the notice violated the FDCPA because it required Jerman
to dispute the alleged debt in writing even though the act imposed no
such restriction.
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Under the FDCPA, debt collectors may avoid liability if they can establish either of two defenses. First, a “safe harbor” defense carves out
an exemption for any act done or omitted in good faith in conformity
with any advisory opinion of the Federal Trade Commission. Second, a
“bona fide error” defense exempts debt collectors from liability if they
prove that the violation was not intentional and resulted from a bona
fide error notwithstanding the maintenance of procedures reasonably
adapted to avoid any such error.
Respondents moved for summary judgment asserting the bona fide
error defense. They argued that although they fully intended to notify
Jerman that she was required to dispute the debt in writing, the
resulting FDCPA violation was not “intentional” within the meaning
of the bona fide error defense because they honestly misunderstood
what the act required. Moreover, they argued, their law firm maintained procedures reasonably adapted to avoid such legal errors,
including among other things designating one of the firm’s principals
to take the lead in FDCPA compliance, sending him to continuing education classes on the act, and subscribing to relevant legal periodicals.
The district court agreed and entered summary judgment for the law
firm.
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit affirmed. The court noted that Congress
originally borrowed the language of the FDCPA’s bona fide error
defense from the Truth in Lending Act (TILA). Three years after the
passage of the FDCPA, Congress amended TILA to expressly provide
that “an error of legal judgment with respect to a person’s obligations
under TILA is not a bona fide error.” As a result, the Sixth Circuit
concluded that the amendment indicated that, unlike TILA, Congress
did not intend to limit the FDCPA’s defense to clerical errors. On June
29, 2009, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
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CASE ANALYSIS
Petitioner Jerman asserts that interpreting the FDCPA to provide
a defense for mistakes of law is inconsistent with the text to the
statute. In order to qualify for the bona fide error defense, the violation must not be intentional and the actor must have maintained
procedures reasonably adapted to avoid any such error. Petitioner
posits that to say that a “violation” of the law “was not intentional”
could mean one of two things. It could mean that the defendant did
not intend to commit the act that violated the statute. Alternatively, it
could mean that a defendant knew exactly what she was doing but did
not realize that her intentional act would violate the statute. Mistakes
of law could find shelter in the bona fide error defense only under the
second interpretation. In this case, for example, the respondents do
not contest that they intended to include in their letter the language
that violates the act. They argue only that their conduct, although
intentional, did not constitute an intentional violation of the statute.
Jerman argues that the language of the bona fide error defense must
be understood in light of the familiar legal maxim that ignorance
of the law will not excuse any person, either civilly or criminally.
The general rule that ignorance of the law or a mistake of law is no
defense to criminal prosecution is deeply rooted in the American legal
system. Of course, Congress occasionally departs from this standard
rule, but exceptions are rare. The most common examples are found
in criminal statutes that limit punishment to those who violate the
law knowing its requirements. But the bona fide error defense applies
to civil not criminal claims, and it does not simply limit penalties
and remedies. It provides a defense to any liability. It is exceedingly
rare—indeed, as far as petitioner can tell, completely unprecedented—for Congress to make ignorance of the law a complete defense
to all liability in the civil context. Statutory references to intentional
conduct, or even intentional violations, are best understood to refer
to defendants’ intentions with respect to their actions, not to their
intention to disobey a known legal duty. At the very least, they establish that the phrase does not unambiguously demonstrate Congress’s
intent to make an exception to the venerable principle that ignorance
of the law is no defense.
She contends that had Congress intended to provide a defense for
mistakes of law, it would have used different language in § 1692k(c).
When Congress intends to refer to defendants who know their
conduct is unlawful, it generally uses the word “willful” rather than
“intentional.” It is unlikely that in enacting the FDCPA, Congress
used the work “intentional” intending for courts to give it the meaning traditionally reserved for the word “willful.” In fact, the origins of
the bona fide error defense belie any such suggestions. The language
of the defense originated in the Truth in Lending Act, which unlike
the FDCPA, contains both a civil private right of action and criminal
penalties. Under TILA, the bona fide error defense applies to those
who do not violate the act intentionally, and the criminal provision
applies only to those who “willfully and knowingly” fail to comply with
the act.
This distinction between “intentional” violations on the one hand
and “willful and knowing” violations on the other is consistent
with the ordinary legal use of those terms. Willful violations, being
the most culpable because undertaken with knowledge of the act’s
requirements, are subject to the severe sanction of criminal penalties. On the other end of the spectrum, truly unintentional violations
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where the lender did not intend to commit the act that violates the
statute qualify for a complete defense. It should come as no surprise,
therefore, that by the time Congress enacted the FDCPA, every court
of appeals to have considered the question had rejected the view that
TILA’s bona fide error defense excused mistakes of law. The inescapable conclusion is that under TILA a mistake of law was a defense to
criminal charges but did not fall within the bona fide error defense to
civil liability. Because Congress adopted the FDCPA’s bona fide error
defense verbatim from TILA, it is presumed to have intended the
same limitation on the scope of the FDCPA’s bona fide error defense
as well.
Jerman also maintains that in addition to requiring that the defendant’s violation be unintentional, the act provides a defense only if
the defendant has maintained, “procedures reasonably adapted to
avoid any such error.” The Sixth Circuit acknowledged that “it is more
common to speak of procedures adapted to avoid clerical errors than
to speak of procedures adapted to avoid mistakes of law.” Indeed, the
difficulty of applying the act’s reasonable procedures requirement to
legal errors provides a significant reason to conclude Congress did not
intend courts to attempt it. There are any numbers of ways in which
clerical and other nonlegal errors may lead to unintended violations of
the statute. On the other hand, courts that have extended the defense
to legal errors have struggled to define just what constitutes a procedure reasonably adapted to avoid misinterpreting the law. Moreover,
applying the reasonable procedures requirement to legal errors is
not only difficult, but it puts federal courts (or even lay juries) in the
awkward position of having to establish standards for the professional
conduct of attorneys, an area traditionally left to the states. Jerman
reasons that the Supreme Court should not adopt a construction of
the act that would “alter the existing balance of federal and state powers” “absent a clear indication of Congress’ intent” to do so.
Petitioner further argues that allowing a mistake of law defense
renders the advisory opinion process ineffective, and the safe harbor
defense superfluous. Congress provided a “safe harbor” defense, under which debt collectors are immune from liability for “any act done
or omitted in good faith” in conformity with any advisory opinion of
the Commission. Recognizing a defense for mistakes of law conflicts
with this provision in two ways. First, it is unlikely that Congress
would have intended courts to force an awkward fit between legal
errors and the bona fide error defense when it had already provided
a more direct solution to the same problem. Second, the court of appeals’ decision renders the safe harbor defense superfluous. Under
that decision, every application of the safe harbor defense is already
covered by the bona fide error provision. The Supreme Court has long
expressed a deep reluctance to interpret a statutory provision so as to
render superfluous other provisions in the same enactment. Here, the
bona fide error and safe harbor defenses may easily be harmonized,
the former addressing nonlegal errors and the latter addressing errors
of legal judgment.
Jerman also asserts that excusing legal errors would undermine
the FDCPA’s deterrent effect. Congress was well aware that the debt
collection market—which generally compensates collectors by giving
them a percentage of the money collected—establishes an economic
incentive for aggressive, misleading, and even abusive practices.
Excusing mistakes of law conflicts with Congress’s intent to ensure
that those debt collectors who refrain from abusive debt collection
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practices are not competitively disadvantaged. As between similarly
situated debt collectors, all having procedures reasonably designed to
avoid legal errors, the Sixth Circuit’s decision provides a competitive
advantage to the collectors who take the more aggressive, but incorrect, view of the law. That result is not only unfair to the law-abiding
collectors, but creates a race to the bottom that will leave the field
to collectors with the fewest scruples. This is exactly what Congress
intended the FDCPA to prevent.
Petitioner also maintains that debt collectors can be protected from
unfair liability without excusing their mistakes of law. Congress
has provided debt collectors with special protections in the form of a
defense for violations based on nonlegal errors, and an easy and costeffective way to obtain expert advice on the meaning of the act that
will shield them from liability so long as they follow it. Moreover, like
all others expected to comply with the sometimes uncertain requirements of the law, debt collectors can mitigate the risk of liability
through careful study of the law, reliance on forms and procedures
developed by expert bodies, and by forgoing practices of questionable
lawfulness. It does not seem unfair to require that one who deliberately goes perilously close to an area of proscribed conduct must
assume the risk that he or she may cross the line. The statute already
provides debt collectors with considerably more protection than other
businesses subject to federal regulation enjoy. If more is required, it
must be sought from Congress rather than this Court.
Finally, petitioner argues that the Sixth Circuit misconstrued the
intent and effect of the 1980 amendment to TILA. The Sixth Circuit
placed significant weight on the fact that in 1980 Congress amended
that law to declare expressly that legal mistakes do not qualify as
bona fide errors under that statute’s defense, but it made no such
amendment to the FDCPA. The court concluded that the fact that the
TILA’s bona fide error provision expressly excludes legal errors while
the analogous provision in the FDCPA does not have such limitation
suggests that, unlike TILA, Congress did not intend to preclude legal
mistakes from protection under the FDCPA. In Jerman’s view, the
court drew the wrong inference from the amendment. It assumed
that the 1980 amendment was meant to change, rather than codify,
existing law as it pertained to legal mistakes. But there is no basis for
that assumption. Congress included its reference to legal errors not to
change the law, but rather to make clear that although other portions
of the 1980 amendment may have expanded the scope of the defense,
Congress did not intend to go so far as to make ignorance of the law
an excuse. In 1980, there was no need to change the meaning of the
TILA to exclude legal mistakes—at that time, every court of appeals
to have construed the defense had already held that mistakes of law
were not covered. Moreover, Congress would have had every reason
to believe that those decisions were correct, and that as enacted,
the statute already excluded mistakes of law. Accordingly, the more
plausible inference is that Congress intended its reference to legal
mistakes to codify the existing consensus.
For their part, the respondents assert that the plain text of the FDCPA
requires that legal errors be included in the bona fide error defense. A
growing majority of federal courts have concluded that nothing in the
FDCPA limits the reach of the defense to clerical errors only. In fact,
respondents say they are unaware of a single decision that excludes
legal errors from the bona fide error defense based on an analysis of
the plain text of the statute. The Supreme Court has long recognized
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that the preeminent canon of statutory interpretation requires courts
to presume that the legislature says in a statute what it means and
means in a statute what it says. Thus, when interpreting language
used by Congress in the absence of statutory definitions, courts
construe words in accordance with their ordinary and natural meanings, in context, and with a view of their place in the overall statutory
scheme. Consequently, it is well established that when the statute’s
language is plain, the sole function of the courts—at least when the
disposition required by the text is not absurd—is to enforce it according to its terms.
Section 1692k(c) is an affirmative defense requiring debt collectors to
prove that their “violation” of the FDCPA was (1) not intentional and
(2) resulted from a bona fide error (3) notwithstanding the maintenance of procedures reasonably adapted to avoid any such error. The
debt collector must only show that the violation was unintentional,
not that the communication itself was unintentional. As commonly
used, violation means “[t]he act or an instance of violating or the
condition of being violated.” Synonyms include breach, infraction,
transgression, trespass, and infringement. Thus, the common meaning
of violation encompasses not only the “act” constituting an infraction, but also the actual “condition being violated,” i.e., the infraction
or violation itself.
The respondents argue that when viewed in the context of the plain
language of the FDCPA, the bona fide error defense does not restrict
the phrase “violation was not intentional” to an “act” constituting the
violation of the statute. A review of the FDCPA’s safe harbor provision
at § 1692k(e) reveals that when Congress intended to limit application of a defense to an “act,” it specifically did so. Had Congress
intended to limit the bona fide error defense to an unintentional
“act or omission,” it could have used language consistent with
§ 1692k(e). Congress did not use the term act in § 1692k(c), but
rather violation.
Respondents posit that the plain language of the bona fide error defense does not exculpate debt collectors who are ignorant of the law.
Jerman, on the other hand, argues that the statutory phrase “violation
was not intentional” must be restricted to “acts” constituting an infraction of the law, based on the criminal law maxim that “ignorance
of the law is no defense.” Petitioner, they say, relies on this argument
in order to inject a meaning into the bona fide error defense that
is otherwise not apparent from the actual text. Her reliance on this
criminal law maxim is unpersuasive, the respondents contend, because it is predicted on a false premise—that the respondents’ error
in legal judgment was the result of “ignorance of the law.” They contend that this characterization of their legal violation is absurd. The
conduct found to be in violation of the FDCPA (the issuance of a letter
requiring a response “in writing) was predicated upon a reasonable
analysis of existing case law in an effort to comply with the statute.
Importantly, the bona fide error defense is not an exception to the
criminal law maxim that “ignorance of the law is no defense.”
Although this affirmative defense includes legal errors, it excludes
ignorance as a basis for establishing the defense. In ordinary English,
ignorance means “[t]he condition of being uneducated, unaware,
or uninformed.” While ignorance may be asserted to establish that a
legal error was unintentional under the bona fide error defense, by
its very definition, ignorance would prove that a debt collector did not
PREVIEW of United States Supreme Court Cases

act in good faith or maintain procedures reasonably adapted to avoid
any such error. Thus the district court did not find that respondents
were ignorant of the law. Rather, it found just the opposite—that
respondents had knowledge and awareness of existing case law.
Stated differently, respondents’ contend that their violation of the
statute was subjectively found to be unintentional because they relied
on existing case law. In addition, their reliance was objectively found
to be made in good faith while maintaining procedures reasonably
adapted to avoid any such error. There is, they say, no factual basis to
assert “ignorance of the law” is involved in this case.
Respondents believe that a plain reading of the bona fide error defense does not render the FDCPA’s safe harbor provision ineffective or
superfluous. Petitioner Jerman broadly characterizes the safe harbor
provision as a means for a debt collector to obtain clarification about
the FDCPA’s meaning and application, where legal uncertainty puts
debt collectors at risk for liability. In the respondents’ view, however,
her suggestion that an advisory opinion is available for all situations
involving “legal uncertainty” is overstated. The “practicability” of
obtaining an advisory opinion from the FTC is highly questionable,
especially in situations in which a lawyer is engaged to initiate
litigation and a delay in obtaining an opinion could impact a statute
of limitations or otherwise adversely compromise a client’s rights.
Obtaining an advisory opinion would also be especially troublesome
in situations such as foreclosures where time is of the essence and
any delay in litigation could result in the value of collateral being
substantial impaired.
This “practicability” is also impacted by the FTC’s internal rule that it
issue advisory opinions only when there is “no clear Commission or
court precedent.” Given this requirement, it is understandable that
the FTC would be reluctant to issue an advisory opinion when there
is existing case law. Finally, Jerman’s characterization of the alleged
broad remedy available under the safe harbor provision ignores the
undeniable complexity of the meaning and application of the FDCPA.
This legislation contains few definitions and is applied without the
benefit of governing administrative rules and regulations. As a result,
there has been litigation on virtually every aspect of the act. Common sense dictates that the bona fide error and safe harbor defenses
are not incompatible and superfluous but rather can and should be
construed to work hand-in-hand.
Respondents believe that the bona fide error defense is consistent
with the purpose of the FDCPA to balance the rights of ethical debt
collectors and consumers. Notwithstanding the remedial purpose
of the FDCPA, Congress was also sensitive to the rights of ethical
debt collectors. Congress expressly acknowledged that an important
purpose of the FDCPA was to eliminate abusive debt collection practices while not competitively disadvantaging ethical debt collectors.
If Congress meant what it said—that ethical debt collectors warrant
protection—it is the petitioner who is asking the Court to disrupt
the balance struck in the FDCPA. Respondents’ conduct was responsible, conservatively based on case law, and unquestionably ethical.
The bona fide error defense does not, as Jerman argues, undermine
the statute’s deterrent effect, nor will it create a race to the bottom
that will leave the field to collectors with the fewest scruples. Petitioner’s assertion that the Sixth Circuit’s decision will embolden debt
collectors to act unethically in a “race to the bottom” ignores the
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serious financial penalties contained in the FDCPA under the civil
and administrative provisions. Indeed, her fear that the floodgates
will be opened to unscrupulous debt collectors has not materialized.
Since the Sixth Circuit’s decision in this case, respondents have
found twenty-one cases in which federal courts have considered the
bona fide error defense as applied to legal errors. Seven courts denied
the defense as a matter of law, eleven found issues of fact, and three
granted summary judgment for the debt collector.
Respondents argue that if legal errors are removed from the bona fide
error defense, lawyers will face potential liability to nonclients for the
exercise of their professional judgment. A lawyer’s potential liability
under the FDCPA will generally be a consequence of claimed legal error. Thus, Jerman’s proposal to restrict the bona fide error defense to
exclude legal errors essentially removes the conduct of lawyers from
the ambit of the bona fide error defense—leaving them with no protection from liability for even the most unintentional and good faith
errors in professional judgment. This is tantamount to congressional
control of attorney advocacy under the FDCPA, subjecting even the
most ethical attorneys to lawsuits by nonclients for exercising professional judgment. Most states recognize a litigation privilege that
generally shields an attorney from a third-party claim arising from
litigation activities. Petitioner’s attempt to remove the vast majority
of attorney errors from the bona fide error defense would necessarily
drive a wedge between debt collection lawyers and their clients.
Respondents also argue that TILA does not warrant setting aside the
plain meaning of the FDCPA. In this regard, they say, petitioner’s
analogy to the bona fide error defense in TILA is flawed. Jerman
argues that § 1692k(c) excludes legal errors because (1) Congress
“borrowed” the language from TILA’s then current bona fide error
defense when it enacted the FDCPA and (2) Congress understood
the allegedly “settled” interpretation of the pre-1980 TILA defense to
exclude legal errors.
The respondents contend there are a number of problems with this
argument. First, it wrongly assumes that when Congress utilizes
language from an existing statute in a new statute, there is a
presumption that Congress intended to adopt the existing judicial
interpretations of that language. On the contrary, the respondents
say, the Supreme Court has recognized several factors that must be
considered in determining whether Congress intended to adopt existing judicial interpretations. These include (1) whether the judicial
interpretations are settled and (2) whether congressional intent has
been expressed in the legislative history or stated purpose of the
statute. Regarding the first factor, respondents argue, the judicial
interpretation of TILA’s bona fide error defense was unsettled: the Supreme Court had never reviewed the language petitioner claims was
lifted from the pre-1980 version of TILA and inserted into the FDCPA,
nor was there a consensus among the lower courts. As to the second
factor, Congress did not express an intent in the FDCPA’s legislative
history to adopt any particular judicial interpretation of TILA’s bona
fide error defense.
When enacting the FDCPA, Congress did not indicate that the bona
fide error defense should be construed consistent with any interpretations of TILA. In fact, the legislative histories of TILA and the FDCPA
are significantly different. The legislative history of TILA reflects

187

Congress’s inclusion of the bona fide error defense in response to
complaints from creditors that clerical errors would be inevitable
due to the complexity of mathematical computations. Conversely, the
legislative history of the FDCPA shows that Congress granted more
expansive protection, stating that a debt collector has no liability if
he violates the act in any manner, including with regard to the act’s
coverage, when such violation is unintentional and occurred despite
procedures designed to avoid such violations. The fact that Congress
chose not to amend the FDCPA to exclude legal errors—despite having amended the statute several times—defeats any attempt to draw
parallels between the defenses now. The legislative history of the
FDCPA does not evidence a restricted congressional intent to adopt
TILA’s bona fide error defense.
Respondents further maintain that the express purpose of the
FDCPA demonstrates that Congress did not intend to adopt TILA’s
more limited bona fide error defense. Finding that there has been a
congressional adoption of judicial interpretation is only appropriate
when analyzing statutes with the same or similar objectives. In this
case, however, the purposes of TILA and the FDCPA are fundamentally
different. The purpose of TILA is exclusively to protect consumers
through “a meaningful disclosure of credit terms.” The FDCPA, on
the other hand, was drafted to balance the purposes of (1) eliminating abusive debt collecting practices while (2) not competitively
disadvantaging nonabusive debt collectors. These differing legislative
purposes support the inclusion of legal errors within the FDCPA’s
bona fide error defense. While TILA provides creditors with several
avenues to avoid liability for legal errors, the FDCPA does not. If legal
mistakes are removed from the plain language of the FDCPA’s bona
fide error defense, ethical debt collectors will be left with only the safe
harbor defense which, as already demonstrated, is often impracticable
or unavailable. Therefore, to give effect to the FDCPA’s express purposes of balancing the interests of both consumers and ethical debt
collectors, legal errors cannot be removed from the plain language of
the bona fide error defense.
Finally, the respondents add that the 1980 TILA amendments do not
support a restrictive interpretation of the FDCPA’s bona fide error defense either. Congress amended TILA to remove legal errors
concerning the act’s coverage from protection. The FDCPA was not so
amended despite Congress having had the opportunity to do so on
numerous occasions. Petitioner’s assertion that the 1980 amendments demonstrate a congressional intent to exclude legal errors from
the FDCPA’s bona fide error defense presumes that in all likelihood,
the issue never occurred to Congress. Congress’s failure to amend
§ 1692k(c) since 1980, however, leads to the opposite conclusion. In
1986, Congress did amend the FDCPA to repeal the exemption for
attorneys. In 1995, the Supreme Court highlighted the “clerical versus
legal error’ debate in Heintz v. Jenkins, 514 U.S. 291, when it held that
lawyers are liable under the FDCPA as debt collectors. Since Heintz,
the vast majority of circuit and district courts have determined that
§ 1692k(c) is not limited to clerical errors.
Nevertheless, Congress has remained silent on this issue. It is recognized that when Congress had abundant opportunity to give further
expression of its will, the failure to do so amounts to legislative
approval and ratification of the construction given the statutes by the
courts. These principles of statutory construction are especially appli-
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cable when, as in this case, the statute has undergone amendments.
Thus, the respondents contend, petitioner’s assertion that Congress
forgot to amend the FDCPA is unpersuasive. In their view, the fact
that Congress did not amend the bona fide error defense in the
FDCPA to exclude legal mistake on eight occasions since the 1980
TILA amendments signifies its ratification and approval of the construction placed upon § 1692k(c) by a growing majority of courts.

SIGNIFICANCE
While both parties agree that the outcome of this case will have a major impact on debt collection law and practice, they disagree sharply
as to what the effect will be.
From petitioner Karen L. Jerman’s perspective, extending the bona
fide error defense to legal errors would undermine Congress’s efforts
to deter abusive collection practices. Allowing this defense to suit
would encourage debt collectors to take an aggressive view of the law
when its requirements are not clear, knowing that there will be no
liability if they cross the line into illegal conduct.
From the respondent law firm’s point of view as debt collectors,
however, requiring collectors to prove the three elements of the bona
fide error defense by a preponderance of the evidence will protect
consumers from unethical collectors, but failing to extend the defense
to legal errors at all would undermined the congressional intent to
equitably balance the valid interests of both consumers and ethical
debt collectors.
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